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Abstract
This paper outlines a heterodox and largely unexplored conception of objecthood
according to which the notion of an individual object is a determinable. §1 outlines
the view. §2 argues that the view is incompatible with a natural analysis of kind-
membership and, as a consequence, undermines the Quinean distinction between
ontology and ideology. The view is then used to alleviate one source of Quinean
hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility in §3, and to elucidate
Fine’s neo-Aristoteltian, non-modal conception of essence in §4. §5 concludes.
This paper examines an intriguing and under-explored conception of objecthood, inspired
by David Wiggins’ brief and scattered remarks on the topic.1 Although I do believe that
Wiggins endorses roughly the view described below, I will not defend that claim here. My
goal is not scholarly reconstruction of Wiggins’ position, but to articulate a heterodox
conception of objecthood inspired by Wiggins’ remarks, and to outline some theoretical
work to which it might be put. One diﬃculty in relating this view toWiggins’ own is that
his discussion comes intertwined with an interest in our ways of representing and concep-
tualising things, whereas my project lies at a squarely metaphysical, non-representational
level.
I should sound a note of caution before I begin. It is not entirely clear to me whether
coherent sense can be made of the view. The concepts involved are so foundational that
the resources available with which to explicate it are limited. This is often the way within
metaphysics, where the subject matter is so broad and the perspective so abstract that the-
orising strains against the limits of the vocabulary in which it is conducted. So I write this
paper in an exploratory spirit, as an attempt to articulate a view at the outer limits of intel-
ligibility. In so doing, I hope to illuminate the contours of our conceptual scheme and the
*Thanks for comments and discussion at various points to Mahrad Almotahari, Will Bynoe, Billy Dun-
away, Peter Fritz, Anil Gomes, David Liggins, FraserMacBride, PenelopeMackie, RoryMadden,MikeMar-
tin, L.A. Paul, Trevor Teitel, Al Wilson, the members of the Hossack-Textor WiP group, and a referee for
OUP. Thanks also to audiences at the Logic and Metaphysics Forum in London, the Reality Making con-
ference in Nottingham, and the Jowett Society in Oxford.
1 See, for example (Wiggins, 1997, §§5, 7), (Wiggins, 2001, pp6, 8 13–14, 57), (Wiggins, 2012, pp8–9).
2hidden assumptions embodied by more familiar attitudes towards it. I therefore focus ex-
clusively on explicating a conception of objecthood; positive arguments for it must await
another occasion.
The thesis under examination is that the notion of an individual object is a deter-
minable: there are many diﬀerent and incompatible ways of being an object, by being one
or another determinate kind of object. I spell this out further in §1. The interest of the
position is twofold. Firstly, it is a heterodox conception of a foundational component of
our conceptual scheme, which exposes the metaphysical and conceptual presuppositions
of orthodoxy. I begin uncovering these presuppositions in §2, arguing that the view un-
dermines the Quinean dichotomy of ontology and ideology by blurring the distinction
between classification and the domain of things classified. This blurring is used in §3 to
diagnose and respond to one source of Quinean hostility to non-trivial restrictions on de
re possibility. The remainder of the paper concerns the second source of interest for the
view: it allows systematisation and unification of some core components of a broadlyAris-
totelianmetaphysic. The restrictions on de re possibility discussed in §3 are one such com-
ponent. §4 discusses two others: a non-modal notion of essence that imposes restrictions
on de re possibility, and the related notion of real definition. §5 concludes.
1 TheThesis
This section introduces the target conception of objecthood:
Object is a determinable (OD): The notion of an individual object is a determinable.
Clarification is in order. I begin with the notion of an object, before turning to deter-
minables.
My notion of an object is the most general and inclusive notion of thing, item, entity,
being, or individual. This minimally restrictive notion of object is the notion relevant to
ontology, the maximally inclusive inquiry into all reality, from whose purview nothing
is excluded. In this sense, the objects are what unrestricted singular nominal quantifiers
range over; objects are the values of the variables bound by such quantifiers.
Unrestricted quantification is controversial;2 fortunately, my notion of object can be
modified to avoid reliance on it. The impossibility of unrestricted quantification is consis-
tent with the possibility of minimally restricted quantification. Maybe no suchminimally
restrictive interpretation of the quantifier is fully exhaustive. Nevertheless, we may iden-
tify the objects with what a singular nominal quantifier ranges over on some minimally
restrictive interpretation or other.3 On this view, the supply of objects outstrips any given
interpretation of the linguistic device of singular nominal quantification, without going
beyond its reach in principle. Setting this issue about unrestricted quantification to one
side, properties, concepts, functions, abstractions, artworks, electrons, economies, ecosys-
tems, universals, tropes, clouds, humans, and anything else whatsoever are all objects on
this minimally restrictive notion of object (assuming that there are indeed such things).
2 For discussion, see the papers in (Rayo and Uzquiano, 2006).
3 I ignore delicacies concerning the logical form of quantification over interpretations. See (Williamson,
2003) for discussion.
3This appeal to linguistic resources in my account of objecthood resembles Bob Hale’s
claim that “ontological categorization…is dependent upon and derivative from prior logi-
cal categorization of expressions.”4 UnlikeHale, however, I do not see this as a substantive
issue. Ontology requires a maximally general and minimally committal notion of a thing.
That is what unrestricted quantification provides. Linguistic tools play a purely reference-
fixing role here, stipulatively fixing the meaning of ‘object’. It is an open question whether
interesting ontological distinctions subdivide the category of objects, andwhether all such
distinctions must have logico-semantic correlates, as Hale appears to suggest. According
to the view articulated below, there are indeed such distinctions, though I see no reason
to think of them as reflected in logico-semantic form (except in the special case of certain
artificial languages designed expressly for that purpose and discussed in §§2, 3).
I now turn to determinables.5 Rather than oﬀering an exhaustive analysis here, I seek
only to introduce a reasonably familiar notion, emphasising those features of import to
the coming discussion.
Thedeterminate/determinable contrast ismost familiar from the theory of properties.
Determinable properties are those that canbehad inmanydiﬀerentways; their determina-
tions are the diﬀerent ways of having them. For example, red is a paradigm determinable.
There are many diﬀerent ways of being red: by being scarlet, or vermillion, or rouge, or….
These diﬀerentways of being red—i.e. scarlet, vermillion, rouge,…—are the determinations
of red.
The central notion here is the relational x determines y, not the monadic x is determi-
nate and y is determinable; formany determinables are themselves determinations of other
determinables. Red, for example, is a determination of coloured: oneway of being coloured
is by being red, another is by being green, or by being orange etc. And since one way of
being coloured is by being red, and one way of being red is by being vermillion, it follows
that one way of being coloured is by being vermillion: determination is transitive.
The determination relation has certain modal characteristics. It is not possible to have
a determinable without having some determination thereof, e.g.: it’s not possible to be red
without being scarlet, or vermillion, or rouge, or….6 But for any given determination of a
determinable, it’s possible to have the determinable without having that particular deter-
mination, by having some other determination instead, e.g.: it’s possible to be red without
being scarlet, by being vermillion instead. Finally, it’s not possible to have a determination
without having every property it determines, e.g.: it’s not possible to be scarlet without
being both red, and coloured.
Do these modal features exhaust the determination relation? It appears not.7 Con-
sider a list of all possible kinds of concrete thing. Suppose none of those kinds can possibly
belong to non-concrete things. Then: (a) it’s not possible to be spatially located without
belonging to one of those kinds; (b) for any given one of those kinds, it’s possible to be
spatially located without belonging to it, by belonging to some other kind instead; (c) it’s
4 (Hale, 2013, p10)
5 For discussion and references, see (Sanford, 2013).
6 Counterexample: a red object that’s diﬀerent shades in diﬀerent areas of its surface. Still, the claim in
the text will do as an approximation. Something along roughly those lines seems to be correct, and nothing
that follows requires a better approximation. Thanks to TimWilliamson here.
7 For a similar argument, see (Dunaway, 2013, §4)
4not possible to belong to any of those kinds without having every determinable of spatially
located. But those kinds are not determinations of spatially located; for being an electron
and being a cat aren’t ways of being spatially located.
The determination relation entails but is not entailed by the modal relations just de-
scribed. So how do these relations stand to one another? It is natural to see determination
as a more demanding and intimate relation, in virtue of which the modal relations obtain.
What exactly is this more intimate relation? My proposal is this:8
Determination: To have a determinable just is to have some determination thereof.
For any determinable F, for an object to have F just is for that object to have some
determination of F.
For any determinable F, for an object x to be F just is for x to be such that, for some
determinationG of F, x isG.
For any determinable F, for an object to be F just is for that object to beG1, orG2,
or G3, or…(where G1;G2;G3; : : : are all the determinations of F at some level of
specificity).
Except for the last, I take these to be little more than stylistic variants, diﬀering only in
perspicuity of logical form. The last employs (potentially infinitary) disjunction where
the others employ existential quantification over determinations. Although that is an im-
portant diﬀerence, I intend to leave both options open.
Determination employs the locution ‘to be F just is to be G’. There seem to be two
diﬀerent readings of this locution, a reductive reading and an identity reading. I’ll say a
little about each, though I needn’t choose between them.
On the reductive reading, being G is more fundamental than being F, an explication
in more metaphysically perspicuous terms of what being F involves. On this reading, ‘to
be F just is to be G’ is plausibly transitive, but asymmetric and irreflexive. This is akin to
Kit Fine’s notion of strict full ground.9
The identity reading expresses an (higher-order) identity between being F and being
G.10 These are two diﬀerent presentations of a single underlying phenomenon. On this
reading ‘to be F just is to beG’ is transitive, reflexive, symmetric and, like ordinary identity,
entails a (higher-order form of ) indiscernibility: 8Φ(Φ(F) $ Φ(G)), where ‘Φ’ is a
second-level predicate variable. This is akin to Fine’s notion of weak full ground.11
Whichever reading we adopt, Determination entails a substantive thesis about the
relationship between determinables and their determinations: things have determinables
in virtue of having determinations thereof, and facts involving determinables always hold
8 (Yablo, 1992, §2) endorses a similar proposal, thoughhe emphasises themodal aspects of determination
more heavily than I.
9 (Fine, 2012, §5)
10 (Rayo, 2013, ch.2) employs this reading. In Rayo’s hands, however, the identity reading combines with
a coarse-grained conception of content to render ‘to be F just is to be G’ equivalent to the metaphysically
necessitated and universally generalised material biconditional ‘8x(Fx $ Gx)’. This would undermine
my distinction between determination and the modal relations discussed above.
11 (Fine, 2012, §5)
5in virtue of more fundamental facts involving their determinations. This thesis will bear a
lot of argumentative weight later.
Why does that entailment hold? Plausibly, a true disjunction is true in virtue of its
having a true disjunct. And a true existential generalisation is true in virtue of its having
a witness.12 Moreover, facts about disjunctions and existential generalisations all hold in
virtue of facts about their disjuncts and (potential) witnesses. The level of particular dis-
juncts and witnesses is more fundamental than the level of disjunctions and existentials,
so that facts about the latter are always grounded in facts about the former. According
to Determination, possession of a determinable reduces to (or is identical with) an exis-
tential over (or disjunction of ) its determinations. So the corresponding theses hold for
determinables and their determinations: the level of particular determinations is more
fundamental than the level of determinables, so that facts about determinables are always
grounded in facts about their determinations.
This argument rests onDetermination. That’s a substantive thesis, which I haven’t de-
fended properly here. Still, it’s a plausible and attractive thesis about determination. Even
if it turns out that Determination fails for some intuitive paradigms of determination,
we can focus instead on determination* instead, for which Determination is stipulated
to hold. It’s determinate/determinable structure as characterised above that concerns me
here.
The two key components of OD are now in place: object and determination. So let us
return to making sense of OD.
Determinate/determinable structure was introduced in application to properties, or
classifications of things. The relata of the determination relation were ways for objects to
be. Can we make sense of exporting this structure from the classificatory realm to the no-
tion of an object— a thing—itself; that is, from classifications to that which is classified?
The idea behindOD is that we can.
Some terminology and a simplifying assumption will be helpful in explicating this
idea. A complete determination is a determination that cannot be further determined; it
is maximally specific. Note that the relevant notion of maximality depends on the deter-
minable in question. Amaximally specific shade of red needn’t settle the state of the entire
universe, even though any property that fails to do so is, in a sense, less specific than one
that does. Relatedly, maximally specifics colours incorporate diﬀerent information about
their bearers than do maximally specific masses. The lesson is that each determinable is
associated with a range of dimensions of variation, diﬀerent dimensions with diﬀerent
determinables.13 A complete determination is maximally specific in the determinable’s
associated dimensions, not in every dimension of variation whatsoever. It is not trivial
that every determinable can be completely determined. To simplify exposition, however,
I will assume that they can. If it turns out otherwise, we need only select some level of
determination to serve as complete relative to the present discussion.
According toOD, the notion of an individual object is determinable. A kind is a com-
plete determination of the determinable object; I use ‘kind’ in this sense exclusively hence-
forth. Note that since kinds are maximally specific, diﬀerent kinds are incompatible. We
12 These claims are encoded in the rules_I and 9I of Fine’s impure logic of ground. (Fine, 2012, §7)
13 (Funkhouser, 2006) develops an interesting account of determination centred around this idea.
6are now in a position to restateOD in line withDetermination:
• There are many diﬀerent ways of being an object, by being one or another kind of
object.
To be an object just is to be some kind of object or other.
To be an object just is to be a cat, or a dog, or a planet, or….
For exposition’s sake, I assume throughout that cat, dog, planet and other familiar sorts of
thing are kinds in the sense relevant toOD: complete determinations of object. Although
certainly non-trivial, nothing that follows turns on the specifics of what kinds there are.
Recall that true disjunctions and existentials are true in virtue of having true disjuncts
or witnesses, that the level of particular disjuncts and witnesses is more fundamental than
the level of disjunctions and existentials, and that facts about the latter all hold in virtue
of facts about the former. Those same ideas apply here. According toOD, for any object
whatsoever, it is an object only by virtue of its being some particular kind of object, a cat,
or a dog, or whatever it happens to be; its being that kind of object is what grounds its
being an object at all. Moreover, the maximally specific level of kinds of object is more
fundamental than the level of the determinable object: facts about the latter all hold in
virtue of facts about the former. This consequence of OD will do much argumentative
work later.
The central idea behindOD is now in place. Before we move on, a question remains.
I said that each determination is associated with some dimensions of variation, and that
complete determinations are maximally specific in each of a determinable’s associated di-
mensions. What dimensions are associated with object? What forms of variation yield
the diﬀerent kinds of object? An ultimately defensible view must answer these questions.
Sincemyprimary concern iswith structural features of OD, not the specifics ofwhat kinds
there are or how they’re diﬀerentiated, I won’t take a stand on the issue here. By way of
illustration, however, I’ll sketch one sort of answer that might be extracted fromWiggins’
work.
On this view, diﬀerent determinations of object are supplied by diﬀerent sortals. Sor-
tals delineate a thing’s spatial and temporal boundaries, thereby separating it from its en-
vironment.14 Diﬀerent sortals result from variation in how this delineation is achieved.
One highly general question is whether the delineation results from a principle of activ-
ity, or of function.15 Each principle of activity corresponds to a distinctive variety of be-
haviour, underwritten by the laws of nature; these supply the sortals for natural kinds.
Each principle of function corresponds to a function a thing can serve; these supply the
14 A generalisation beyond the spatial of the notions of boundary and path will be needed to accommo-
date abstracta. One natural such generalisation identifies (or, perhaps better, represents) paths with equiv-
alence classes, in the manner of neo-Fregean, or “abstractionist”, approaches to the metaphysics of mathe-
matics. On this kind of view, a path through the lines is an equivalence class of lines. Directions of lines are
the occupants of paths that are equivalence classes of parallel lines. Other equivalence classes of lines are the
paths of other sorts of abstraction from lines. See, e.g., (Wright, 1983) and (Hale andWright, 2001).
15 See principle D(v) in (Wiggins, 2001, p72), and the discussion in his ch2. Wiggins appears to allow
for a third option: a principle of operation. I am not sure how principles of operation and function are
supposed to diﬀer.
7sortals for artefacts. For example, the spatial path of a car that undergoes replacement of
parts is determinednot by somenatural law about cars, but by the function cars serve: a car
persists through whatever changes preserve its function of transporting people around.16
Further determinations arise from further specification of these principles of activity and
function. Many diﬃcult questions now arise. What forms of characteristic behaviour are
there? How should the functions of artefacts be classified? And, most fundamentally: is
there really a single collection of parameters such that all possible principles of activity and
function result from specification of values for each parameter? I won’t consider these is-
sues here. ThisWiggins-inspired proposal was intended only for illustration. It is time to
move on. The next section explicatesOD further by looking more closely at exactly what
kind-membership involves.
2 Kind-membership
This section examines the nature of kind-membership. What is it for an object to belong
to a kind? I oﬀer two arguments to show that OD precludes true, informative answers
of a certain type. This underwrites the application of OD to de re possibility in the next
section.
First argument
Let o be an object of kindK. What is it for o to belong toK, or for o to be aK? Onemight
expect an informative answer in the form of a claim about o: for o to be a K is for o to….
I now argue that OD rules out any such answer. I first reject one natural candidate, and
then generalise from there.
The natural candidate account of kind-membership is this: for an object to be a K is
for that object to instantiate the kind-property of being a K. The problem arises when we
ask what notion of object is employed on the right hand side of this account. A dilemma
arises.
First horn: the determinable notion object. The last section argued that all facts involv-
ing this determinable hold in virtue of facts involving its determinations. In particular, an
object in the determinable sense instantiates being a K in virtue of that object in the non-
determinable,K-involving sense instantiating being aK. But then the account presupposes
what it was supposed to explicate. The goal was to explicate o’s membership of K. It now
turns out that the candidate explication obtains in virtue of a fact that itself involves o’s
membership of K. In sum, OD entails that facts involving the determinable notion of
object all hold in virtue of facts involving particular kinds; this blocks an account of kind-
membership from being given in terms that neither themselves involve, nor hold in virtue
of, facts involving the very instances of kind-membership at issue.
Secondhorn: thenon-determinable notionof a(n individual)K. But then the account
employs the very notion of kind-membership it was supposed to explicate, by employing
the K-involving determination of object. This renders the account at best uninformative:
16 This is only a first pass. It will need complicating to accommodate temporarily inoperative cars.
8instantiating being a K adds no information not already encoded in the notion of object
employed by the account.
On either horn, the account is at best uninformative, and at worst objectionably circu-
lar. Instantiating the property of being aK adds no new information beyondwhat’s already
encoded in theK-involving notion of object employed in the account, whether directly (as
on the second horn), or indirectly via the facts in virtue of which the account obtains (as
on the first horn).
The argument generalises beyond this particular account of kind-membership. Noth-
ing in the argument turnedonmentioningkind-properties in the accountof kind-membership;
any claim about the object in question would have done in its place. The lesson is this:
what it is for an object o to belong to a kindK cannot be understood as involving, or hold-
ing in virtue of, any kind of predicational fact (or complex of facts) involving o; for any
such facts are either K-involving themselves or hold in virtue of K-involving facts; both
cases induce objectionable circularity. In a certain sense then, kind-membership facts are
amongst the most fundamental facts about any given object: they don’t hold in virtue of
any other facts about the object. Kind-membership is thus unlike ordinary predication.
It’s not concerned with what the object is like, or the state of the object, or classifications
of the object. It’s concerned with the appropriate notion of object itself; that is, with the
sense in which a thing counts as a thing at all.
Although I find this argument compelling, I sympathise with those who might think
it smells fishy. It rests heavily on talk of K-involving facts, levels of facts holding in virtue
of other levels of facts, and the interaction between determinations of object and reference
to particular objects. This can all feel slippery, and is diﬃcult tomake completely tractable
and precise. In order to dispel suspicion, I’ll now run essentially the same argument again,
but from a somewhat diﬀerent theoretical perspective.
Second argument
I’ve talked a lot about some facts holding in virtue of others, with the latter being more
fundamental than the former. One way to make these notions tractable, and to impose
some discipline on them, is by employing the following methodology.17
Suppose you claim that the G-facts hold in virtue of the more fundamental F-facts.
The methodology dictates that you proceed as follows. You describe two types of repre-
sentation, one for the F-facts and another for the G-facts. You make sure that the struc-
tures of these representations as closely mirror the structures of the relevant types of fact
as you can. Then you specify a mapping from representations of the one type to represen-
tations of the other. This mapping represents the “in virtue of ” relationship between the
two types of fact, capturing the manner in which the more fundamental F-facts generate
the less fundamental G-facts on your view. You have thereby shown, in a systematic and
general way, exactly how you take the G-facts to emerge from the F-facts. Given any F-
facts representable in your chosen way, the mapping specifies exactly which G-facts they
give rise to.
17 A systematic and illuminating application of this methodology is (Turner, MS). My approach owes
much to Turner’s work.
9To make this more concrete, consider linguistic representations, of the sort employed
when formulating metaphysical theories about the nature of reality. The goal will be to
describe two types of linguistic representation, two languages, whose structures as closely
match those of the F-facts and G-facts as possible. Diﬀerent categories of primitive ex-
pression will represent diﬀerent varieties of structure exhibited by those facts. Diﬀerent
primitive expressions from a category will represent diﬀerent instances of the variety of
structure represented by that category. With these two languages in place, the goal will be
to specify a mapping from collections of truths in the F-language to collections of truths
in theG-language. The mapping encodes how diﬀerent collections ofG-facts describable
by theG-language emerge from collections of F-facts describable by the F-language.
We can be more concrete still. According to OD, facts involving the determinable
object all hold in virtue of facts involving its maximally specific determinations. So we
need one language for the determinable, and another for the kinds.
Our determinable languageL  is an ordinary first-order predicate calculus with iden-
tity. Singular terms of L  represent particular objects, diﬀerent terms for diﬀerent ob-
jects. The determinable notion of an object is represented in L  by the uniform category
of singular terms, comprising a single logico-semantic category. L  also contains a special
stock of monadic kind-predicates ‘K1’, ‘K2’ etc.. Kind-membership facts are represented
by atomic predications featuring these predicates, e.g.: ‘K1(a)’.
What should our determinate language L+ be like? One option is simply to supple-
ment a first-order language with a privileged stock of kind-predicates. Kind-membership
is then represented by predications employing these predicates. Yet this is inadequate in
two related respects. Firstly, this language is justL  again; so we haven’t diﬀerentiated the
determinable notion of object from its complete determinations. Secondly this language
employs the fully general and undiﬀerentiated determinable notion of an object, as rep-
resented by the uniform category of singular terms; so it doesn’t capture what we want it
to.
The second problem suggests that we need to modify the supply of singular terms,
since those are what most directly represent particular objects. So we depart from a stan-
dard first-order language in two ways. First, we add a stock of privileged kind-predicates
‘K1’, ‘K2’ etc. Second, we use subscripts to syntactically sort the singular terms of the lan-
guage ‘a1’, ‘a2’, ‘b1’, ‘b2’ etc. The resulting language L+ is a form of many-sorted language.
Diﬀerent syntactic sortings on terms represent diﬀerent kinds; diﬀerent singular terms of
a sort represent diﬀerent objects of the kind represented by that sort. Unlike a standard
many-sorted language, we needn’t sort the argument positions of L+-predicates to re-
strict wellformedness; for we haven’t seen any reason to regard object-determinations as
restricting what kinds of facts or truths about an individual there can be.
This language L+ isn’t quite what we want to represent the level of complete deter-
minations of object. There is representational redundancy in L+: two diﬀerent kinds of
linguistic structure do a single representational job. To see this, consider the predications
used inL+ to say that anobject belongs to a givenkind, e.g. ‘Kcat(acat)’. Thekind-predicate
‘Kcat’ is used here to say that a certain object is of the kind cat. But that information is al-
ready encoded in the syntactic marking on the term ‘acat’ used to refer to the object. (And
if it weren’t, so that the termwas sorted for some other kind, ‘Kcat(acat)’ would be false.) So
10
there are two diﬀerentways of representing kind-membership inL+: kind-predicates and
sorting. So there’s a mismatch between the structures of L+ and of the level of complete
object-determinations. Two diﬀerent kinds of linguistic resource in L+ represent a sin-
gle aspect of reality’s structure. To obtain a language whose structure more closely mirrors
that of the facts in question, either the sorting or the kind-predicatesmust go. Eliminating
the sorting leaves a uniform category of terms, out of line withOD’s plurality of kinds. So
the kind-predicates must go. Call the resulting languageL+. We now have a language free
from representational redundancy: the primitive expressions and categories of expression
of L+ correspond to the various diﬀerent types of structure reality exhibits at the level of
complete object-determinations.
Shouldwe sort the variables ofL+, as well as its terms? Given that syntactic sortsmark
kinds, that would amount to restricting all quantification to a single kind. Although there
is no problem of principle with such restricted quantification, we have seen no reason to
think that the truths of unrestricted generality hold in virtue of those of kind-restricted
generality, or that the members of diﬀerent kinds exist in diﬀerent senses (corresponding
to the diﬀerent kind-restricted quantifiers). For all that has been said, themost fundamen-
tal forms of generality may be completely unrestricted. It is only the notion of an object,
a potential witness for an unrestricted existential quantifier, that advocates of OD need
regard as determinable. So we don’t sort variables in L+.18
Our two linguistic representations are now inplace, the determinable languageL  and
the kind language L+. We now have to specify a mapping from collections L+-sentences
to collections of L -sentences. This represents the way that (potential) states of reality
describable from themore fundamental perspective ofL+ ground the corresponding states
describable from the less fundamental perspective of L . To do so, I’ll say what counts
as an interpretation of each language, and a mapping from each interpretation I+ of L+
to a corresponding interpretation I  of L . The target mapping between collections of
sentences is that from the L+-sentences true on I+ to the L -sentences true on I .
An interpretation of L  is a standard first-order model: a domain for the quantifiers
plus matching assignment of denotations to terms and extensions to predicates. An in-
terpretation of L+ is similar, with one key exception. Its domain comprises a variety of
sub-domains, corresponding to the diﬀerent kinds of objects. Each sort is associated with
a sub-domain. A term’s denotation is drawn from the sub-domain associated with its sort.
Since diﬀerent kinds are diﬀerent complete determinations of object, we require that these
sub-domains be exclusive. So for diﬀerent sorts i; j, L+-sentences of the form pti = tjq
are false on every interpretation. Quantifiers range over the entire union of these sub-
domains.
Before we can characterise a mapping from interpretations of L+ to those of L , we
need to say more about the relations between their non-logical vocabularies. Our focus is
only on the diﬀerence between the determinable and determinate notions of object. We
18 L+ is similar to one of the languages that Turner considers using to capture ontological pluralism, the
thesis of a plurality of fundamental notions of existence (Turner, 2010, esp. 11–13). The key diﬀerence is
the interpretations we place on these languages. Turner wants to capture a plurality of notions of existence.
I want to capture a plurality of notions of object. ThusTurner uses sorting to restrict quantification, whereas
I don’t.
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have seen no reason for object-determinations to restrict the supply of (potential) facts,
or of what properties can meaningfully be attributed to objects. So we can legitimately
assume a translation function f from L -expressions such that: f one-one correlates the
non-kind L -predicates with the L+-predicates; f one-one correlates the kind-predicates
of L  with sorts of L+; f one-one correlates the L -terms with L+-terms. Note that al-
though there will be many such functions, only one is correct; for our targets are inter-
preted languages suited to describe particular extra-linguistic facts, rather than just the
abstract structure thereof.19
An interpretation I  of L  is obtained from an interpretation I+ of L+ by unifying
the sub-domains, assigning each as the extension of some kind-predicate. For each kind-
predicate Ki of L , its I -extension is the sub-domain I+ associates with sort f(Ki). For
each non-kind L -predicate P, its I -extension is the I+-extension of f(P). For each L -
term t, its I -denotation is the I+-denotation of f(t). TheL -sentences true under I  rep-
resent the determinable-level truths that hold in virtue of the kind-level truths represented
by the L+-sentences true under I+.
We now have two types of linguistic representation. One employs the determinable
notion object, whereas the other employs the whole panoply of kinds. Given a description
of (some portion of ) reality in kind-level terms— corresponding to theL+sentences true
under some interpretation I+—we also have an account of exactly which determinable-
level truths hold in virtue of it, i.e.: those represented by the L -sentences true under the
matching interpretation I . Claims about one level of facts holding in virtue of another
should no longer be seen as mere hand-waving. We have precise accounts of just what the
structures of those two levels amount to, and of how one depends upon the other. With
this to hand, can we find an informative account of what it is for an object o to belong to
a kindK? No.
Suppose our account is formulated inL . In linewithOD, the account is true in virtue
of something expressible in L+. In L+, kind-membership is represented as sorting. So no
L+-sentence about o can provide an informative account of what it is for o to belong toK.
Any such sentence must feature a term for o. That term will be sorted for K. So whatever
the sentence says, the most it can do is express in other terms the information about kind
already represented by the sort of the term for o. The account adds no new information
beyond the sorting of terms. That holds irrespective ofwhat other vocabularyL+ contains.
So the underlyingmetaphysical basis—which is expressible inL+—of the account inL 
of what it is for o to belong to K renders that account at best uninformative, and at worst
objectionably circular by virtue of employing the very kind-membership fact (under the
guise of sorting on the L+-term for o) it was supposed to provide an account of.
That was an objection to accounts of kind-membership in L . Giving the account in
L+ clearly changes nothing. Any such account can only restate information already en-
coded by the sort of the term employed by the account to pick out the relevant object.
And so we have our conclusion: kind-membership facts are amongst the most fundamen-
tal facts about an individual; they do not hold in virtue of any other facts about that indi-
19 A more general and complicated approach would require only that each L -predicate is translated
(= definable) by some complex predicate/open sentence of L+, rather than by some primitive predicate. I
adopt themore restrictive approach above tominimise complications unnecessary for the arguments below.
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vidual. Maybe there are deeper levels of reality in virtue of which all facts about o obtain,
including kind-membership facts. What we have seen is that the facts in such deeper levels
are not facts about o itself. Suppose, for example, that Tibbles is a cat in virtue of her con-
stituent particles having a certain configuration. According to the argument just given,
the underlying metaphysical base here cannot be a fact about Tibbles. So what is it? It
must be a fact about certain particles and their configuration, as opposed to a complex
fact involving Tibbles, the constitution relation, the particles, and their configuration.
Ontology, ideology, and kind
We’ve just seen that the most fundamental facts about an object include its being of a
certain kind. Another interesting feature of kind-predication also emerges, diﬀerentiating
it from other forms of predication.
There are two types of L -predicate: kind-predicates and the rest. There is a sig-
nificant diﬀerence between the metaphysical bases of these diﬀerent predicates. Those
bases are most perspicuously represented in L+. When characterising the mapping from
L+-interpretations I+ to correspondingL -interpretations I , the I -extension of a non-
kind L -predicate was determined by its translation into L+. The I -extensions of kind-
predicates were not determined in that way. No predicate (whether simple or complex)
of L+ need be coextensive with any kind-predicate of L . Rather, the I -extensions of
kind-predicates were settled entirely by the sorting of L+-terms.20 From the more fun-
damental perspective of L+ therefore, the L -predicates play two diﬀerent metaphysical
roles. Non-kind L -predicates play the familiar classificatory role, corresponding as they
do to L+-predicates. The contrasting role of kind-predicates’ role is to report on name-
sorting/object-determination; their applicability is determined by the array of notions of
object, and the corresponding array of sorts, not by further classifications of those objects
expressible with predicates in L+. Here’s howWiggins puts it:
There is a range of basic sortal attributions that we apply to various every-
day things—‘this is a horse’, ‘this is a tree’, ‘that is a man’. These belong to
the level of ontology and, at least to this extent, ontology and ideology must
contaminate one another immediately.21
On Wiggins’ view, these basic sortal attributions mark object-determinations. Wiggins’
observation is thus that kind-predicates fall on neither the ontological nor ideological side
of the Quinean division between elements of the domain and what can be said of them.
The distinction between these two metaphysical roles is invisible from the perspec-
tive of a one-sorted language like L . From that perspective, all predicates play the same
logico-semantic role: they pick out a subset of the domain as that to which they apply.
20 More precisely: the I -extensions of kind-predicates were settled by the I+-sub-domains associated
with the sorts of L+-terms. If we’d insisted that everything in the I+-domains be named in L+, we could
have appealed only to sorts, without going via sub-domains. Since we are doing metaphysics here, using
linguistic structures to represent reality’s structure, we may legitimately require that everything in the I+-
domains be named.
21 (Wiggins, 2001, p147)
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Their diﬀerential ontological import is thereby obscured. The uniform category of singu-
lar terms creates a misleading impression of uniformity where there is great metaphysical
variety, disguising the connection between kind-predicates and the plurality of notions
of object. It is only from the more fundamental perspective of the many-sorted language
L+ that the relevant distinctions emerge. If one’s metaphysical theorising is conducted
through the lens of one-sorted predicate calculus, therefore, the distinctions drawn by
OD will be invisible or, worse, unintelligible. This is an instance of a more general phe-
nomenon: the background linguistic/conceptual framework in which theorising is con-
ducted constrains the views open for consideration. To the extent that the contemporary
notion of object has been shaped by the pervasiveness of one-sorted predicate calculus, it
will be hard to make coherent sense of OD. And to the extent we employ a one-sorted
metalanguage for L+, that many-sorted language’s metaphysical import will be similarly
hard to understand. The defender of ODwill thus maintain that conceptual and theoret-
ical reconfiguration is required here.
The many-sorted language alone does not capture the import of OD. Its sorts can
always be combined to yield a one-sorted alternative, or interpreted in a one-sorted meta-
language. It is only when the many sorts of L+ are interpreted as representing the object-
determinations of OD that their import becomes clear. Andby so interpreting those sorts,
the content of OD is itself brought into sharper focus.
This section put some flesh onOD by examining the nature of kind-membership. We
saw that OD precludes informative analyses of a certain sort, and hence that an object’s
kind is amongst themost fundamental facts about it. This generated a distinction between
the instantiation of ordinary, non-kind properties and kind-membership. That distinction
does not admit of perspicuous representation within orthodox, one-sorted predicate cal-
culus, where Quine’s distinction between ontology and ideology is rigorously enforced.
That distinction, and the consequent unintelligibility of OD, is a basic presupposition
of theorising within standard, one-sorted predicate calculus. Ordinary predicate calculus
does not provide a neutral setting in which to conduct metaphysical debate, and certainly
not one amenable toOD.The dominance of this way of thinking— formalisation in pred-
icate calculus is one of the first things our undergraduates are taught—and the influence it
exerts on contemporary conceptions of objecthood is part of what makesOD so diﬃcult
to articulate. The tools available with which to do so have been shaped by the framework
to whichOD is opposed. The next section examines one way in which this has influenced
recent thinking about de re possibility.
3 An invidious distinction?
This section usesOD to explain restrictions on de re possibility, and to diagnose one source
of resistance to such restrictions.
W.V.O. Quine was notoriously hostile towards de re modality.22 There were at least
two aspects to this hostility. Onewas hostility towards the intelligibility of an object’s nec-
essarily satisfying a condition, independently of how the object is presented or described.
22 (Quine, 1961), (Quine, 1976). See (Fine, 2005, pp1–7) for discussion.
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I will not discuss that here. Another was hostility towards diﬀerential necessary satisfac-
tion: why are some properties and not others necessary to an object, and why are diﬀerent
properties necessary to diﬀerent objects? Quine accused advocates of diﬀerential neces-
sary satisfaction of “an invidious attitude toward certain ways of uniquely specifying x…as
somehow better revealing of the “essence” of the object.”23 That accusation will be my
focus here.
David Lewis also raised this concern. Say that a property F is modally essential to x
when it’s impossible for x to exist and lack F: (Ex! Fx).24 Lewis complained that the
modal essentialist…:
“…says that there are qualitative constraints on haecceitistic diﬀerence; there
is no world at all…where you are a poached egg. Why not? He owes us some
sort of answer, and it may be no easy thing to find a good one. Once you
start it’s hard to stop—those theories that provide haecceitistic diﬀerences
at all do not provide any very good way to limit them.…[C]onsider a set of
sentences…which says of you, by name, that you are a poached egg. If this set
is consistent, it is an ersatz world according to which you are a poached egg.
The burden…is to say what makes this set inconsistent.”25
Lewis’ immediate target in the closing remarks is the linguistic ersatzist identification of
possible worlds with maximal consistent sets of sentences. Yet his point is quite general.
Modal essentialists face an explanatory challenge of the form: why is F but notGmodally
essential to x, whereas G but not F is modally essential to y? Lewis does not see how this
challenge might be met.
A satisfactory response to Quine and Lewis requires an explanation for why some but
not all of an object’s properties are modally essential to it, and why diﬀerent properties
are modally essential to diﬀerent objects.26 OD can provide such an account. As in the
previous section, I’ll run essentially the same argument from two diﬀerent theoretical per-
spectives.
First argument
De re possibility is concerned with what’s the case at worlds linked with actuality in a cer-
tain way. Whether it’s possible for an object o to be F depends on how actuality is linked
to the worlds at which there are Fs. It’s possible for o to be F iﬀ, for some world w, one of
the things that’sF atw is o; that is, the things that actually exist are linked to the things that
are F at w by the single object o’s presence amongst each. The objects thus provide links
between how reality is according to various worlds, and how reality actually is. Without
those links, diﬀerent worlds would represent counterfactual circumstances involving en-
tirely diﬀerent things.27 According toOD, the notion of object that provides these links
23 (Quine, 1961, p155)
24 ‘E’ is the existence predicate. To exist is to be identical to something, hence: 8x(E(x)$ 9y(y = x)).
25 (Lewis, 1986)
26 (Paul, 2006, §1).
27 I consider counterpart theory shortly.
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is classificatorily rich. The fundamental notions of object linking these worlds with actu-
ality are kind-involving ones. Since the notions of object supplying these links are kind-
involving, so are the links themselves. Any world at which an object exists is thus a world
at which it belongs to its actual kind. So each object’s kind is modally essential to it.
I envisage two kinds of objection to this argument.
First obection: counterpart-theoretic semantics for de re modality.28 Counterpart
theory associates each object with a representative relative to each world at which it ex-
ists. These latter objects represent possibilities for the former, despite not being identical
to it. The classificatory content built into a thing’s object-determination thus needn’t be
shared by everything that represents a possibility for it, thereby blocking my argument.
Although this objection is correct, it doesn’t eliminate my argument’s interest. That
argument shows thatOD combines with standard, non-counterpart-theoretic modal se-
mantics to inducenon-trivial restrictions onde repossibility. It’s only under anon-standard
and controversial interpretation of de re modal discourse that the argument doesn’t go
through.
Second objection: the fundamental modal notions are necessity and possibility, not
the language of world-relativisation on which my argument rests; and it’s unclear how to
adapt my argument to this alternative setting. I am sympathetic to the thought that the
language of worlds is less fundamental than other, more familiar modal notions. Below, I
present a version of this argument that applies to these other idioms too.
The argument fromOD to non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility is now in place.
Aswith theprevious section’s first argument, it rests on the interactionbetweenvocabulary
thatmight feel slippery or otherwise suspicious: worlds, links betweenworlds, and object-
determinations. To eliminate these suspicions, I’ll run essentially the same argument from
the methodological perspective of the previous section’s second argument.
Second argument
In virtue of what are modal truths true? I now examine three candidate answers to this
question. In line with the previous section’s methodology, I focus on linguistic represen-
tations corresponding to these answers.
We first need to supplement one of our languages to express de re modality. Since
true sentences of the determinable language are true in virtue of facts expressible in the
determinate language, I’ll focus on the latter. Let L+ be the result of enriching L+ with
the ‘’ of metaphysical possibility. In virtue of what are L+-sentences of the form pAq
true? I now consider three kinds of answer to this question.
First answer: possibility-facts don’t obtain in virtueof anymore fundamental possibility-
free base; possibility belongs to reality’smetaphysical bedrock. Call this view fundamental
modalism. On this attractive view, the most fundamental account of what makes a modal
sentence of L+ true will be what’s expressed by that sentence itself.29 So consider an
28 See (Lewis, 1968), (Lewis, 1986), and (Stalnaker, 1986) for discussion.
29 A complication: plausibly, it’s possible for there to be a cat in virtue of it being possible for there to
be cat-wise configured particles. The scope of the claim in the text needs restricting to L+-sentences con-
taining only absolutely fundamental vocabulary. Since our focus is modal truths about particular objects,
we can treat all vocabulary of L+ as absolutely fundamental for the purposes of the present discussion.
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example: ‘F(acat)’. What does this sentence express? The answer follows from two ob-
servations:
(1) Term-sorting represents object-determination: one says that an object belongs to a
kind by using a term for the object that’s sorted for that kind.
(2) The material within the scope of ‘’ expresses what is the case from some counter-
factual perspective. So if A express that P, then pAq says that this could possibly
have been the case: P.
(1) and (2) imply that ‘F(acat)’ says that the following could possibly have been the case:
a certain cat is F. More generally: any possibility for this object expressible using ‘acat’ (or
any other name sorted for cat) is a possibility at which it’s a cat. Possibilities at which this
object isn’t a cat are expressible in L+ only by using terms sorted for other kinds. Since
kinds are complete object-determinations, andhencemutually incompatible, no such term
is co-referential with ‘acat’: pti = tjq is false whenever i 6= j.30 Generalising: possibilities
at which an object doesn’t fall under its actual kind are in principle inexpressible in L+.
So either: (a) there are no such possibilities; or (b) there are but they’re inexpressible in
L+. The same argument shows that such possibilities are inexpressible in all extensions
of L+ that represent kinds by sorting terms. Since that’s how we’re representing kinds,
we should reject (b). The linguistic structure of sorting in L+ is supposed to capture
the underlying metaphysical structure of kind-membership. To admit possibilities about
kind-membership that are in principle inexpressible in L+ — and in any other language
that represents kind-membership in the same way— is to admit that it is unsuited for this
task: that style of representation is inadequate because it’s unable to capture the interaction
betweenkinds andmodality. Assuming that this style of representation accurately captures
reality’s structure according toOD, defenders of OD should conclude that nothing could
possibly belong to a kind other than its actual one: each object’s kind is modally essential
to it.
The only response I can see is to reject (1) in favour of a diﬀerent account of the repre-
sentational role of sorts. Rather than taking sorting to represent kind simpliciter, wemight
instead endorse:
(1*) Term-sorting represents actual object-determination: one says that an object actu-
ally belongs to a kind by using a term for the object that’s sorted for that kind.
(1*) and (2) imply that ‘F(acat)’ says that the following could possibly have been the case:
a certain actual cat isF. By the same reasoning as before: every possibility for this object ex-
pressible inL+ is one at which it’s actually a cat. Yet even if those exhaust the possibilities
for the object, that’s consistent with it possibly failing to be a cat.
As this alternative approach currently stands, L+ suﬀers an expressive deficit. It can-
not express what kinds an object could possibly belong to. It can represent only a things’s
actual kind. A fully adequate account of the interaction between modality and kind re-
quires elimination of this deficit. How should this be achieved?
30 As was argued in the previous section.
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The only option I see is to supplement L+ with kind-predicates. One then says what
kinds an object could possibly have belonged to by concatenating the appropriate kind-
predicates with a term for the object within the scope of ‘’. And one says that an object
could have belonged to a kind other than its actual one with a sentence like ‘Kdog(acat)’.31
Defenders of OD should reject this approach. It uses diﬀerent linguistic resources to
represent actual and possible membership of a kind. Actual kind-membership is repre-
sented by sorting terms. Possible kind-membership is represented by certain (modalised)
predications. On the approach pursued here, diﬀerent types of linguistic resource repre-
sent diﬀerent aspects of reality’s structure. So actual and possible kind-membership are
represented as involving diﬀerent aspects of reality’s structure. Suppose o isn’t actually a
K, although it could possibly have been. Consider the counterfactual fact of o’s being a
K. On the present approach, this counterfactual fact is of a fundamentally diﬀerent sort
from the actual fact of o’s being a K. Whereas actual kind-membership modifies the ap-
propriate notion of object, merely possible kind-membership modifies merely the way an
object (possibly) is, leaving the underlying notion of object intact. It is therefore unclear in
what sense these could count as forms of the same phenomenon considered from diﬀerent
(actual and counterfactual) perspectives. So (1*) should be rejected. My argument from
OD to restrictions on de re possibility stands.
In sum, the point is this. Sorting of terms is a relatively spartan and inflexible linguistic
structure, with limited scope for interaction with modal operators. By representing kinds
in this way, we represent kinds as exhibiting a similarly spartan and inflexible structure,
capable of interacting with modality in similarly limited ways. Restrictions on how sorts
can interact withmodal operators yield restrictions on how kinds interact with possibility.
The resulting representation of kinds is as modally essential to their members.
That argument turnedon fundamentalmodalism: modal facts needn’t obtain in virtue
of any deeper, non-modal facts. A diﬀerent approach grounds the truths of possibility and
necessity in the truths about worlds. We can run essentially the same argument on the
following version of this view.
Let L+w be the result of extending L+ with: (i) a privileged stock of world-variables
‘wi’; (ii) an operator ‘At : : : : : : :’ which takes world-variables in its first argument position
and sentences in its second, to yield a sentence. Sentences of L+w will represent that in
virtue of which sentences ofL+ are true (if true). In particular, trueL+-sentences of the
form pAq are true in virtue of what the corresponding L+w-sentence p9w(At w : A)q
represents.32
Consider theL+-sentence ‘F(acat)’. If this is true, it’s true in virtue ofwhat thisL+w-
sentence expresses: ‘9w(At w : F(acat))’. What does that sentence express? The answer
follows from:
(1) Term-sorting represents object-determination: one says that an object belongs to a
kind by using a term for the object that’s sorted for that kind.
31 Assumption: dog and cat are diﬀerent kinds.
32 More carefully, we use the following clauses to recursively define a mapping  from L+-formulae to
L+w-formulae: for atomic A, A = A; (A ^ B) = (A ^ B); (:A) = :(A); (A) = 9w(At
w : (A)). A expresses that in virtue of which A is true (if it is true). Note that the claim in the text holds
only when A contains no modal operators.
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(2w) The material within the scope of pAt w : Aq expresses what is the case from the
(typically counterfactual) perspective of world w. So if A express that P, then pAt
w : Aq says that this is the case from w’s perspective: P.
(1) and (2w) imply that ‘9w(Atw : F(acat))’ says that there is a world fromwhose perspec-
tive the following is the case: a certain cat isF.33 If beingF is incompatible with being a cat,
therewill be no suchworlds. Generalising: at noworld expressible inL+w does any object’s
kind diﬀer from its actual kind. So if an object could possibly have failed to belong to its
actual kind, that in virtue of which this is so is inexpressible inL+w.34 So either: (a) it’s not
possible for things to fail to belong to their actual kind; or (b) although that’s possible, that
in virtue of which it’s possible isn’t expressible in L+w. We should reject (b) for the same
reasons as before. To admit modal truths whose metaphysical basis is inexpressible inL+w
is to admit that L+w is unsuited to represent the interaction between worlds and kinds.
Assuming that this style of representation accurately captures reality’s structure according
toOD, defenders of OD should conclude that nothing could possibly fail to belong to its
actual kind: each object’s kind is modally essential to it.
What these arguments suggest is that, if we are to allow modal variation in kind, our
account of that in virtue of which modal claims about an object are true need not em-
ploy terms for that object’s actual kind. But the only L+w-terms for an object are sorted
for its actual kind. So we will have to avoid using terms for the object at all. The most
straightforward way to implement this is via a version of counterpart theory.35 We asso-
ciate each object with a representative relative to each world at which it exists. Truths of
de re possibility for an individual hold in virtue of world-relative truths about its represen-
tatives. This licenses rejection of (2w), undermining the argument fromOD to the modal
essentiality of kind. I won’t consider exactly how to reformulate (2w) here.
Back to Quine and Lewis
We’ve now seen how OD combines with three views about the metaphysics of modal-
ity. In particular, we saw that it combines with both a non-reductive and a world-based
modal metaphysics to yield non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility. We also saw how a
counterpart-theoretic approach to de re possibility undermines those arguments. Defend-
ers of ODwho reject counterpart theory can use this to respond toQuine and Lewis. The
structure of objecthood itself induces non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility.
Note the limitations of this argumentative strategy. It can show only that an object’s
kind, and any properties entailed by that kind, are modally essential to the object. The
argument is neutral about the modal status of all other properties. Maybe there are no
other sources of non-trivial restrictions on modal profile; in which case, only kinds and
the properties they entail are modally essential to their bearers. That explains why some
but not all of an object’s properties are modally essential to it. And since diﬀerent objects
are of diﬀerent kinds, diﬀerent objects will have diﬀerent modally essential features too.
We have thereby addressed Quine’s and Lewis’ two explanatory challenges.
33 I assume an appropriate interpretation of the existential quantifier.
34 I ignore complications involving contingent existence for simplicity.
35 See note 28 for details.
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One might respond by attempting to relocate the explanatory challenges to the level
of kinds. One might grant that kinds restrict de re possibility, and yet require further
accounts of why (a) some of an object’s properties are aspects of its kind whereas others
are not, and (b) diﬀerent objects belong to diﬀerent kinds. Three responses are avail-
able. Firstly, kind-membership was not explicated in modal terms; it is a non-modal phe-
nomenon that interactswithmodality in interestingways. Insofar asQuine’s challengewas
directed specifically at the de remodal, it is therefore addressed by appeal to kinds. More-
over, it is unlikely that other Quinean motivations for hostility towards the de re modal
will extend to kind-membership. For example, the argument positions of kind-predicates
are not non-transparent contexts of the sort to which Quine objected. UnderOD, struc-
tural features of objecthood itself provide an extensional mechanism for constraining the
intensional. Secondly, the appropriate analogue of the Quinean challenge is a demand
to explain why an object belongs to the kind that it does, and why diﬀerent objects be-
long to diﬀerent kinds. But according toOD, a thing’s kind provides the sense in which it
even counts as an object, and there is no more fundamental level of facts about the thing.
FromOD’s perspective, the kind-focussed analogue of Quine’s challenge is therefore ille-
gitimate: it arises only within a theoretical framework that defenders of OD have already
rejected. Thirdly, if the new challenge is motivated by epistemic concerns, we can ignore
it here. How can we know what kind a thing belongs to, or what kinds of thing there are?
Those are important questions. But my concern is metaphysical, not epistemic. The goal
is to show how structural features of objecthood can induce non-trivial restrictions on de
re possibility; the goal is not to explain how we can know the details of that structure’s
actual realization. Thatmust be settled in the sameway as any other theoretical matter: by
evaluating overall theoretical packages. I obviously cannot do so here. In sum, Quinean
hostility towards non-trivial restrictions onde remodality is not readily redirected towards
kind-membership.
OD explains why some but not all of an object’s properties are modally essential to
it, and why diﬀerent properties are modally essential to diﬀerent objects. This answers
Quine’s andLewis’ challenges. It alsohighlights howone’s choice of theoretical framework
can influence one’s metaphysical outlook. We have already seen that standard predicate
calculus does not perspicuously represent the distinctions between object-determinations
at the heart of OD, assimilating them to predicative/classificatory diﬀerences (§2). This
obscures the distinctive connection between kind-predicates and objecthood, by enforc-
ing the absolute dichotomy of ontology and ideology that defenders of OD should reject.
That rejection is, in eﬀect, what underwrites the above arguments for the modal essential-
ity of kind. Individuals satisfy certain classificatory apparatus at every world where they
exist because the plurality of fundamental notions of objecthood are, from the perspective
of one-sorted predicate calculus, classificatorily rich. This basis for modal essentiality will
be invisible to those who regard one-sorted predicate calculus as the canonical framework
for the construction and evaluation of theories. Since that was exactly Quine’s view, his
hostility towards modal essentialism is unsurprising. But we need not follow Quine here.
There is no reason to expect that all metaphysically significant distinctions should admit
of perspicuous representation within that sort of system.
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4 Non-modal essence
This section usesOD to explicate a non-modal conception of essence.
Modal essentialism is not the only form of essentialism. There are also non-modal
forms of essentialism deriving from Aristotle. Michael J. Loux and others have argued
that Aristotle’s discussion of essence was not concerned with modal essence.36 On this in-
terpretation, Aristotle was concernedwith a special formof essential instantiation or pred-
ication. Essential instantiation plausibly induces restrictions on de re possibility, though
without being reducible to it. However, essential instantiation is, in principle at least, just
one source of modal essentiality: there is no obvious reason why modally essential prop-
erties should all be instantiated in Aristotle’s special way. In this non-modal sense, the
essence of an object o is glossed as what o is, or alternatively, what it is to be o. The pu-
tative contrast here is with what o is like, or the way that o is. I will reserve “essence” for
non-modal Aristotelian essence henceforth, distinguishing it frommodal essence.
One might doubt whether modal essence really should be distinguished from essence
proper. Maybe that distinction is surplus to requirements. Where Aristotle distinguished
twokinds of instantiation, onemight seek instead simply todistinguish anobject’smodally
essential properties from its contingent ones. This view aims to combine one form of in-
stantiation with de re modality to capture the distinction Aristotle drew with two forms
of instantiation. An influential argument of Kit Fine’s purports to show that this project
is misguided.37
Fine argues that modal essence outstrips essence proper. The central example involves
Socrates and his singleton, {Socrates}. Fine first assumes that being amember of {Socrates}
is not essential to Socrates. He thenobserves that the analogous claim aboutmodal essence
is incompatible with standard views about the modal profiles of sets. Given those views
about sets, it follows that modal essentiality does not imply essentiality.
To see why standard views about sets imply that it’s modally essential to Socrates that
he belong to {Socrates}, suppose otherwise. Then there’s a worldw at which Socrates exists
without belonging to {Socrates}. There are two cases. First case: {Socrates} exists at w. So
Socrates isn’t amember of {Socrates} atw, even though both exist atw. That conflicts with
the rigidity of membership: if x belongs to α at some world, then x belongs to α at every
world atwhich α exists.38 Second case: {Socrates} doesn’t exist atw. That conflictswith the
existence conditions for sets: if themembers of α at someworld atwhich α exists all exist at
another, then so does α; no more than the existence of its sole actual member, Socrates, is
required for the existence of {Socates}. So orthodox views about the modal profiles of sets
render membership of {Socrates} modally essential to Socrates. Given Fine’s assumption
that membership of {Socrates} is not essential to Socrates, it follows that modal essential-
ity does not imply essentiality. That blocks one simple reduction of essence to modality,
by identifying it with modal essentiality. Fine goes on to argue that no more complex
reduction avoids the problem, and hence that essence cannot be reduced to modality.
Before we can evaluate Fine’s argument, we need to ask: what cannot be reduced
36 See (Loux, 1991, ch4) and references therein.
37 (Fine, 1994). An interesting recent discussion is (Wildman, 2013).
38 Strictly, this weaker principle will do: if x belongs to α at someworld, then x belongs to α at every world
at which x and α both exist.
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to modal essence? To see the diﬃculty, consider Fine’s central assumption: belonging
to {Socrates} is not essential to Socrates. Socrates’ essence is supposed to capture what
Socrates is. So a member of {Socrates} is not (even part of ) what Socrates is. But Socrates
certainly is a member of {Socrates}. So although he’s a member of {Socrates}, that’s not
what he is. Why not? Why does belonging to {Socrates} concern only what Socrates is
like, rather than what he is? What diﬀerentiates this modally essential feature of Socrates
from his essence proper? Since essentiality implies modal essentiality, Fine is committed
to a distinction within Socrates’ modally essential properties. On one side lie his merely
modally essential properties. On the other lie Socrates’ essential properties proper. What
does this distinction amount to? Why should we care about it? What justifies Fine’s claim
that belonging to {Socrates} falls on one side, rather than the other? Absent more infor-
mation about the content of Fine’s target notion of essence, it is not clear how to set about
answering these questions.
These doubts about Fine’s example illustrate the obscurity ofAristotelian essencemore
generally. It is unclear what diﬀerentiates a thing’s essential properties from its other prop-
erties, including its other modally essential properties. Suppose we disagree over whether
Socrates is essentially human. I say that a human is what Socrates is. You say that a hu-
man is what Socrates is like, not what he is. We agree about everything else, including
that Socrates couldn’t exist without being a human. We disagree only about whether he
instantiates human in the special essential way. Absent further guidance about what this
special form of instantiation amounts to, it is hard to see this dispute as substantive.
A natural place to look for such guidance is where Fine introduces his target notion of
essence. As we will see, however, this leads round in circles.39
[O]ne of the central concerns of metaphysics is with the identity of things,
with what they are.…[W]hat appears to distinguish the intended properties
is that they are essential to their bearers.40
[T]he notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics
of identity is not to be understood in modal terms.41
Both passages connect essence with identity. This is puzzling. Essence is a classificatory
matter; it concerns the properties of things. Identity is not normally regarded as a classifi-
catorymatter. Questions about identity concernwhich individual a thing is, notwhat it is.
Moreover, identity is a relation. Insofar as the monadic locution ‘the identity of x’ makes
any sense at all, it simply denotes x, or maybe the complex relational property λy[y = x].
Fine thus appears to be using ‘identity’ in a non-standard way. E.J. Lowe follows him here,
claiming that there are two notions of identity.42 One concerns essence. The other con-
cerns the identity relation. Maybe so. Since this non-standard notion of identity is simply
another name for essence, however, the connection between essence and identity is unil-
luminating. A more satisfying approach would oﬀer an informative connection between
identity proper (the relation) and the properties that constitute a thing’s essence.
39 Not that Fine claims otherwise.
40 (Fine, 1994, p1)
41 (Fine, 1994, p3)
42 (Lowe, 2008, §2)
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Fine also connects essence with definition:
[T]he traditional assimilation of essence to definition is better suited [than
modal essentiality] to the task of explaining what essence is. It may not pro-
vide us with an analysis of the concept, but it does provide a good model of
how the concept works.43
[E]ssence as a form of definition. Under this alternative conception, each
item would give rise to its own sphere of truths, the truths that had their
source in the identity of the object in question. Thus the proper expression
of the claim that x essentially φ’s would…[be] that it is true in virtue of the
identity of x that it φ’s, or that it φ’s if x exists.44
Again, Fine connects essence with identity, now oﬀering identity as the source of a rich
body of essential truths. These truths comprise a definition of the object in question.
Again, however, this is unilluminating. Definitions as standardly conceived concernwords,
not objects. Or, because words are objects, a better formulation would be: definitions
explicate the semantic properties of objects. Since most objects, Socrates included, lack
semantic content, they lack definitions in this sense. So a non-standard notion of defini-
tion is needed, tomatch Fine’s non-standard notion of identity. Given a notion of essence,
we could introduce a notion of definition whose purpose was to capture a thing’s essence.
And given an appropriate notion of definition, we could introduce a notion of essence as
that which such definitions capture. Until we understand one or the other, however, no
progress can be made.
Appeals to definition and identity are uninformative as to the content of Fine’s target
notion of essence. They do not help us to understand what it is that he thinks cannot be
reduced to modality, or provide any insight into the motivation for his argument’s key
premiss, i.e. that membership of {Socrates} is not essential to Socrates. The possibility
remains that essence cannot be further analysed; it is to be understood in its own terms,
or not at all. Analysis has to finish somewhere. But I doubt that it should finish here.
Non-modal essence is too rarefied a theoretical construct to provide a secure foundation
on which to base our metaphysical theorising. Luckily, we can do better. We can useOD
to explicate non-modal essence without requiring a prior grip on what essence is. I do not
claim that this captures Fine’s intention. I claim only that this is one way of articulating a
notion with the features Fine requires, and which is intelligible to the uninitiated.
My suggestion is that essence goes with object-determination. To explicate a thing’s
essence is to locate it within the space of object-determinations, to say what kind of ob-
ject it is and hence in what sense it even counts as an object. This explains why essence
requires a special variety of instantiation. As we saw earlier,OD induces a distinction be-
tween the metaphysical bases of ordinary predication and kind-predication. To belong
to a kind is not to instantiate a kind-property because the fundamental notions of object
are themselves kind-involving. OD thereby generates a distinction between instantiating
a property and belonging to a kind. Although both are represented by predications inL ,
43 (Fine, 1994, p3)
44 (Fine, 1995, p273)
23
the more fundamental perspective of L+ uses quite diﬀerent linguistic resources to repre-
sent their underlying metaphysical structures. The proposed connection between essence
and object-determination thus explains why essence diﬀers from ordinary instantiation,
rather than being analysable as modal essence.
This proposal also explains the connection between essence and identity. If x and y
are identical, then “they” are one and the same object. The defender of OD will ask: one
and the same what? Since the fundamental notions of object are the kinds, each identity-
fact presupposes a kind-membership fact. This is what the question is after. According to
OD, the most fundamental specification of which object something is is a specification of
which cat, or which dog, or which number,…the thing is. OD thus generates a connection
between identity—which object x is—and classification into kinds. Identifying essence
with object-determination thus connects essential classification—what x is—with iden-
tity, as Fine contends. Moreover, this also explains the appropriateness of Fine’s locution
‘truth in virtue of the identity of x’; for truths concerning an object’s kind hold simply in
virtue of which cat, or dog, or proposition, or…it is (identical to in the ordinary relational
sense); they explicate the kind to which it belongs, and thereby the sense in which it’s an
object.
Similarly, a definition of an object may be understood as an account of its kind. To
define x is to say what kind of thing x is. This diﬀerentiates a definition of x from any other
true description of x.
Here is an objection. According to Fine, sets have diﬀerent essences whenever they
have diﬀerent members. Since no two sets have the same members, no two sets have the
same essence. So how can essence go with kind in the manner I suggest? All sets belong to
the kind set; so Finean essence is more fine-grained than kind.
Were my goal to use Wiggins’ own view about objecthood to explicate Fine’s, this
would indeed be a problem. ForWiggins connects object-determinations with substance
sortals, and all sets fall under the substance sortal set.45 However, that is not my goal.
Wiggins’ connection between substance sortals and object-determinations is non-trivial.
Defenders of OD do not have to endorse it; they can admitmore fine-grained distinctions
between object-determinations thanWiggins would countenance. We may therefore see
Fine as endorsing a very fine-grained view about object-determinations in the realm of
sets: each falls under its own kind. Maybe the ordinary notion of kind is not appropri-
ately applied to these non-shareable object-determinations. But that is irrelevant here; for
I am using “kind” in a technical sense to mark maximally specific object-determinations.
Note also that these non-shareable kinds all determine the shareable (and determinable)
object-determination set. Wemay therefore see them as ways of being sets: by having only
Socrates as a member, by having only Socrates and Plato as members, …. This is consistent
with a more coarse-gained view of kind-individuation elsewhere. Defenders of OD are
not committed to non-shareable kinds for, say, ordinary concreta.
On amore speculative note, the non-shareability of each set’s kindmight be viewed as
a consequence, or even explication, of the ontologically “lightweight” and “insubstantial”
nature of sets. On the present proposal, the notion of object appropriate to sets is so thin
45 Sortal S is a substance sortal iﬀ, necessarily, for any object x, if x ever falls under S, then x falls under S
whenever x exists.
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as to bend and flex in tandem with their members. A set is individuated by, or generated
from, its members in so robust a manner that the very sense in which it’s an object de-
pends on its membership. The relation between a set and its members is thus unlike, and
muchmore intimate than, that between ordinary composite objects and their microphys-
ical constituents.
Wehave seen thatOD allowsus to explicate three central aspects of non-modal essence:
(1) the distinction between essential and non-essential instantiation; (2) the connection
between essence and identity; (3) real definition. Given the argument of §3, we can also
explain why essence restricts de re possibility. We thereby reveal these as interrelated com-
ponents of a unifiedmetaphysical picture, rather thanmerely historically associated theses.
We also thereby provide some guidance about the intrinsic content of Aristotelian essence
and essential predication. This should be enough to commendOD to those sympathetic
to a broadly Aristotelian metaphysic.
5 Concluding remarks
I have been articulating a heterodox conception of objecthood that arises from exporting
determinate/determinable structure from the theory of properties to the notion of an ob-
ject itself (§1). On this view, the fundamental notions of object are all kind-involving, and
hence classificatorily rich (§2). This undermines the Quinean dichotomy of ontology and
ideology, exposing the metaphysical presuppositions behind treating standard predicate
calculus as background framework in which all theorising is conducted: even first-order
logic is not metaphysically neutral. This allowed me to diagnose and respond to Quine’s
and Lewis’ hostility towards non-trivial restrictions on de re possibility (§3). Finally, Aris-
totle’s non-modal notion of essence andFine’s recent revival of it were both examined (§4).
Although the import of those notions was initially obscure,ODwas used to provide them
with content. Irrespective of one’s attitude towards OD, the overall lesson is clear. We
cannot hope to settle matters of essence, identity and de re modality without examining
the underlying notion of objecthood itself, and the conceptual presuppositions of the the-
oretical frameworks in which first-order metaphysics is couched along with it.
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